The Mind/Brain Identity Theory - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Jan 12, 2000 · Idiomatically we do use ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we would hardly say ‘Her mind weighs fifty ounces’. Here I take identifying mind and brain as being a matter of identifying processes …
Multiple Realizability - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nov 23, 1998 · William Bechtel and Robert McCauley (1999) develop a version of “heuristic” mind-brain identity theory (HIT) and defend it explicitly against multiple realizability. HIT insists that identity claims in science typically are hypotheses adopted in the course of empirical investigations, which serve to guide subsequent research.
Cognitive Science - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Sep 23, 1996 · The increasing integration of cognitive psychology with neuroscience provides evidence for the mind-brain identity theory according to which mental processes are neural, representational, and computational. Other philosophers dispute such identification on the grounds that minds are embodied in biological systems and extended into the world.
The Neuroscience of Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Oct 9, 2018 · Merker, Bjorn, Kenneth Williford, & David Rudrauf, 2022, “The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness: A Case of Mistaken Identity,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45 (e41): 1–63. doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000881
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia …
Nov 30, 2004 · Variants of the dichotomy between mind and matter range from their fundamental distinction at a primordial level of description to the emergence of mind (consciousness) from the brain as an extremely sophisticated and highly developed material system.
The Computational Theory of Mind - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Oct 16, 2015 · Advances in computing raise the prospect that the mind itself is a computational system—a position known as the computational theory of mind (CTM). Computationalists are researchers who endorse CTM, at least as applied to certain important mental processes.
Multiple Realizability - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nov 23, 1998 · William Bechtel and Robert McCauley (1999) develop a version of “heuristic” mind-brain identity theory (HIT) and defend it explicitly against multiple realizability. HIT insists that identity claims in science typically are hypotheses adopted in the course of empirical investigations, which serve to guide subsequent research.
David Lewis - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Jul 23, 2009 · From his first published philosophy paper, “An Argument for the Identity Theory” (1966a), Lewis defended a version of the mind-brain identity theory (see the entry on the identity theory of mind). As he makes clear in “Reduction of Mind”, this became an important part of his global reductionism.
Dualism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 19, 2003 · In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical – or mind and body or mind and brain – are, in some sense, radically different kinds of things.
Eliminative Materialism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
May 8, 2003 · While it is true that eliminative materialism depends upon the development of a radical scientific theory of the mind, radical theorizing about the mind may itself rest upon our taking seriously the possibility that our common sense perspective may be profoundly mistaken.